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INTRODUCTION 
Why do wicked problems often give birth to bad policy choices? 
Put another way, why do people—in the face of complex social 
challenges—make misdiagnoses, ineffective decisions, or no decisions 
at all? Typical answers point to a plethora of suspects: impatience, 
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myopia, political stalemate, narrow-mindedness, fear and risk aversion, 
hubris, greed, rational self-interest, ignorance, reliance on emotionally 
appealing but misleading anecdotal stories, misuse of evidence, and 
misunderstanding of uncertainty.  
Amid these divergent explanations, two classes emerge: one lies 
in the shortcomings and mistakes of the problem solvers, and the other 
lies in the nature of the problem itself. One stance is to fault the 
ostensible problem solvers: people are not always rational, fair, patient, 
thoughtful, or deliberative, but instead are myopic, selfish, greedy, 
power hungry, or out for revenge (among other motivations). And 
though we call them problem solvers, many are not trying to solve 
problems, but rather seek gains through the process. As such, the 
framework that planners often assume—that the urban world presents 
problems and we then seek solutions—misstates how many individuals, 
firms, and institutions see and engage with the world: a world not as a 
set of problems, but rather as a set of opportunities and threats. 
The second stance is to point to the nature of the problem. This 
is the focus of this Article. In particular, we examine how the dynamics 
of wicked problems1 undermine traditional problem-solving efforts. 
This is not to absolve the problem solvers of responsibility for poor 
policy choices. It is the responsibility of policymakers to diagnose the 
distinctive challenges and needs of wicked problems and act 
accordingly. As urban planning scholars, we focus on entrenched urban 
problems. This focus is not accidental. Horst Rittel (an architect) and 
Melvin Webber (a planning theorist and transportation planner) 
developed the idea of “wicked problems” at the University of California, 
Berkeley’s College of Environmental Design in the early 1970s2—an era 
when the optimism of solving complex social issues through technical, 
scientific solutions was colliding hard with the failure of such efforts to 
 
 1. For a thorough discussion of wicked problems, see Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, 
Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCIS. 155 (1973). Rittel and Webber describe 
several common characteristics of wicked problems: (1) “[t]here is no definitive formulation of a 
wicked problem”; (2) “[w]icked problems have no stopping rule”; (3) “[s]olutions to wicked problems 
are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad”; (4) “[t]here is no immediate and no ultimate test of a 
solution to a wicked problem”; (5) “[e]very solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation;’ 
because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly”; (6) 
“[w]icked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential 
solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into 
the plan”; (7) “[e]very wicked problem is essentially unique”; (8) “[e]very wicked problem can be 
considered to be a symptom of another problem”; (9) “[t]he existence of a discrepancy representing 
a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways,” and “[t]he choice of explanation determines 
the nature of the problem’s resolution”; and (10) “[t]he planner has no right to be wrong.” Id.  
at 161–67. 
 2. See id. at 155–69. 
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conclusively resolve urban poverty, inequality, deindustrialization, 
racism, white flight, and the violence of the “Urban Crisis.” 
In this Article, we build on previous research3 to demonstrate 
how complexity thinking can engage urban challenges at three levels: 
(1) describing “complexity” as a symptom of urban systems; (2) 
analyzing the dynamics of complex urban systems; and ultimately (3) 
intervening through appropriate planning strategies that account for 
complexity.4 We employ this thinking to engage the politics of 
sustainability at the same three levels, illustrating this at two 
geographic scales: the neighborhood5 (specifically, the challenge of 
ecogentrification) and the megaregion6 (and the resulting regional 
externalities and trade-offs). These scales involve actors, conflicts, and 
specializations within planning. Yet both represent new, hybrid 
patterns of urbanization that produce intractable problems of 
environmental unsustainability and social-spatial inequality—two core 
planning priorities that too often collide. Both situations also generate 
novel social policy challenges that conventional planning, thinking, and 
governance tools are ill-equipped to address. These challenges instead 
call for interdepartmental or intergovernmental cooperation. 
The first case we examine is ecogentrification, an unexpected 
portmanteau of two once-separate planning concerns: threats to 
ecological sustainability arising from material-intensive urban 
lifestyles, and neighborhood displacement as both symptom and 
exacerbator of inequality.7 The unlikely alliance of green development 
and gentrification, amid growing income inequality, is producing 
affluent, exclusionary “green islands” of high livability surrounded by 
gray hardscapes of poverty, heat islands, unhealthy environments, and 
poor services.8 Ecogentrification exposes deep-seated tensions between 
 
 3. See Moira Zellner & Scott D. Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity: Pathways to 
Extend Planning with Complex Systems Modelling, in HANDBOOK ON PLANNING AND COMPLEXITY 
258 (Gert de Roo, Claudia Yamu & Christian Zuidema eds., 2020) [hereinafter Zellner & Campbell, 
Planning With(In) Complexity]; Moira Zellner & Scott D. Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted 
Problems: What Can We Learn from Aligning Complex Systems and Wicked Problems?, 16 J. PLAN. 
THEORY & PRAC. 457 (2015) [hereinafter Zellner & Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted Problems].  
 4. See infra Parts I & II. 
 5. See infra Section III.A (Case 1: Ecogentrification). 
 6. See infra Section III.B (Case 2: Megaregional Sustainability: A New Geography in Search 
of Governance). 
 7. See Jennifer L. Rice, Daniel Aldana Cohen, Joshua Long & Jason R. Jurjevich, 
Contradictions of the Climate-Friendly City: New Perspectives on Eco-Gentrification and Housing 
Justice, 4 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RSCH. 145, 146 (2019) (noting that the term “ ‘ecological 
gentrification’ . . . describe[s] the processes by which homeless populations are displaced from 
urban parks as part of ecological improvement projects”). 
 8. NAT’L ENV’T JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF REDEVELOPMENT AND 
REVITALIZATION EFFORTS IN FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 2–3 (2006), 
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the search for environmental equality, housing equality, and dynamic 
housing markets. This confluence of divergent forces generates novel 
forms of urbanization—a hallmark of emergent complex systems.9 And, 
characteristic of wicked problems, there is no consensus about the 
nature of the problem (housing, environment, income?), the jurisdiction 
that oversees it, or the solutions.10 This lack of consensus raises a 
perplexing question of governance: Who is responsible for the problem 
and for solving it? And if no single agency claims ownership of the 
problem, responsibility falls between the cracks. 
The second case is megaregional sustainability, which 
represents a tantalizing new scale of urban development and spatial 
analysis.11 Yet our administrative capacities and political culture have 
not kept up with the megaregion’s conceptual idea. While the 
megaregion is an appealing idea of spatial organization in search of a 
corresponding governance structure,12 we lack the ability to mitigate 
externalities, counter the negative effects of agglomeration, and 
address trade-offs (e.g., growth at the expense of air pollution). The 
megaregion presents a paradox of both promises and troubles: in 
theory, the scale better encompasses both environmental (watersheds, 
air basins, habitats) and social (city-suburb-rural, interracial) 
systems.13 Yet the megaregion also privileges consolidated economic 
interests over ecological and social justice interests.14 
We conclude with implications for governance. Each discipline 
defines governance on its own terms. Urbanists view governance 
broadly, including both formal government institutions and a wider 
array of nonprofit and private entities that shape the built 
environment.15 The discipline of urban planning commonly views the 




 9. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 164–65 (“Every wicked problem is essentially 
unique,” which means that “despite long lists of similarities between a current problem  
and a previous one, there always might be an additional distinguishing property that is of  
overriding importance.”). 
 10. Id. at 164–66. 
 11. See Yoav Hagler, Defining U.S. Megaregions, AMERICA 2050, Nov. 2009, at 1, 1. 
 12. Scott Campbell, The Imperative of Growth, the Rhetoric of Sustainability: The Divergence 
of the Ecoregion and the Global Megaregion, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS 127, 127 (Catherine L. Ross ed., 2009). 
 13. Id. at 128, 132. 
 14. Id. at 132–33. 
 15. Nuno F. da Cruz, Philipp Rode & Michael McQuarrie, New Urban Governance: A Review 
of Current Themes and Future Priorities, 41 J. URB. AFFS. 1, 2 (2019); see also Peter Schmitt & 
Thorsten Wiechmann, Unpacking Spatial Planning as the Governance of Place, 54 DISP – PLAN. 
REV. 21, 25 (2019).  
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than an old-school, narrower view of planning as simply the drafting of 
land use plans).16 If planners face three stages to engage complexity and 
sustainability (acknowledgment, analysis, intervention), governance 
(intervention) is the most challenging step,17 as highlighted in Table 1. 
Traditional urban planning is rooted in the logic of technical rationality, 
including the effective translation of community knowledge and 
interests into goals and policies, and in the ability to connect past 
events, present patterns, and future trends.18 Yet with wicked 
problems, this rational planning model encounters complexity, 
uncertainty, and an intractable lack of convergence of interests. 
Overcoming these obstacles is a formidable task, accomplished neither 
through a rhetorical sleight of hand nor the panacea of new data 
technologies. Using our two examples, we explore how planners and 
stakeholders can address these complex challenges.  
TABLE 1: GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES POSED BY  
COMPLEX, WICKED PROBLEMS 
Traditional governance 
requires... 
But in cases of socio-
environmental wicked 
problems... 
Shared definition of the problem 
and need for intervention 
Little consensus about the problem 
and the pathway to solutions 
Knowledge of cause-effect  
and consequences 
Feedbacks and interactions 
(complexity) make it difficult to keep 
track of causes and effects 
Identification of key parties  
and interests 
Interests, preferences, and 
authority/ability to act are diverse   
Ability to imagine multiple 
interventions and evaluate and 
compare each 
Existing tools do not match the need 
to balance rigor with accessibility, 
individual/local goals with 
collective/regional goals 
Strategic knowledge of the scope 
and limits of public power  
and authority 
Incentives for individual/short-term 
gains and uncertainty about 
regional/long-term effects are high 
 
 16. da Cruz et al., supra note 15, at 2.  
 17. See infra Table 1 (explaining governance challenges posed by complexity and 
sustainability). 
 18. See, e.g., Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 156–57 (“Goal Formulation”).  
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I. HOW DO PLANNERS THINK ABOUT COMPLEXITY  
AND WICKED PROBLEMS? 
Urban and regional planners invariably engage with contested, 
messy urban challenges. Urban systems have distinctive 
characteristics that shape how planners approach complex governance 
challenges.19 Here are six:  
 
1. Cities are both complicated, with many moving parts  
and stakeholders, and complex, due to the dynamics of  
surprising emergence.20  
2. Cities are interactive, with virtuous and vicious cycles of 
growth and decline that undermine the possibility  
of equilibrium.21  
3. Cities are internally heterogeneous and uneven, where 
specialization and spatial and social divisions of labor tend 
to increase with city size.22  
4. Cities tend to spatially concentrate all sorts of social 
phenomena (both good and ill): people, power, capital, 
information, pollution, viruses, culture, crime,  
and innovation.  
5. Cities are adaptive, open social-technological-environmental 
systems.23  
6. Cities are resistant to universal laws. Despite efforts to the 
contrary, there is no singular, stable, ideal form, size, 
density, shape, or design of a city.24 
 
Overall, despite the influence of path dependency in a city’s 
historical development, one cannot always anticipate the outcomes 
based on the characteristics of the starting conditions.25 You have to run 
the model, or let history (and urbanization) run its course, to see what 
 
 19. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259 (discussing 
characteristics of urban systems). 
 20. See Jo da Silva, Sam Kernaghan & Andrés Luque, A Systems Approach to Meeting the 
Challenges of Urban Climate Change, 4 INT’L J. URB. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 125, 129 (2012) 
(advocating for a “systems thinking” approach that considers cities “as complex ‘living’ systems 
undergoing numerous dynamic changes at any given time, constantly evolving and responding to 
both internal interactions and the influence of external factors”). 
 21. Id. at 128. 
 22. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 167 (“[T]he high-scale societies of the Western world 
are becoming increasingly heterogeneous.”). 
 23. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259. 
 24. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 165 (“In the more complex world of social policy 
planning, every situation is likely to be one-of-a-kind.”). 
 25. Id. at 164. 
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emerges. From simple starting conditions emerge complex, varied, and 
surprising outcomes. Yes, it is tempting, in retrospect, to narrate a 
clear, deterministic line from a city’s past to its present and to  
construct universal laws of urbanization, but these laws are  
invariably unreliable. 
These characteristics create a paradox for the planning 
profession: cities both need and resist planning and regulation. Rather 
than strive for optimal efficiency and definitive solutions, planners 
must typically content themselves with compromise, partial answers, 
and the comfort of incremental improvements. Because cities are 
dynamic, volatile, and unpredictable, they elude tidy, technical 
solutions.26 The term “planning” may suggest the calm, rational, and 
technical preparation of ideal blueprints for the good city (and this task 
does remain part of the job). Yet much of a planner’s professional day 
involves mediating, listening to impatient stakeholders who are 
skeptical of public planning and regulation, negotiating conflict, 
interpreting city codes, scrounging for limited funds, and leveraging 
limited resources to make a difference.27 Planning attracts pragmatic 
idealists who believe in promoting the public interest through 
improving the built environment. It is not a professional activity for 
those who need certainty, unquestioned authority, quick answers,  
or perfection. 
It should not be surprising, then, that two urbanists developed 
the idea of the wicked problem.28 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber 
developed this concept at Berkeley during a highly productive, but 
lively and tempestuous, era of urban scholarship, and perhaps the era’s 
two dynamics are connected. There were two colliding impulses. The 
first was planning’s push to gain new scholarly rigor and scientific 
authority in academic and policy circles. Planning scholarship had 
sought academic legitimacy through embracing quantitative methods, 
rational problem-solving, and large-scale modelling, in part to emulate 
the more established disciplines on campus. In his writing, Webber was 
promoting a broader vision of planning as a process of decisionmaking.29 
He pushed against the perception, on campus and beyond, that 
 
 26. See id. at 160, 165 (“In the . . . complex world of social policy planning, every situation is 
likely to be one-of-a-kind.”); da Silva et al., supra note 20, at 129.  
 27. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259.  
 28. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1. 
 29. Melvin M. Webber, The Prospects for Policies Planning, in THE URBAN CONDITION: 
PEOPLE AND POLICY IN THE METROPOLIS 319, 320 (1963) (“[P]lanning is that process of making 
rational decisions about future goals and future courses of action which relies upon explicit 
tracings of the repercussions and of the value implications associated with alternative courses of 
actions, and, in turn, requires explicit evaluation and choice among the alternative matching  
goal-action.”).  
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planning was a “minor profession,” inhibited by its focus on practical 
skills and municipal land use regulations. This effort would only be 
partly successful, as planning could not fully assimilate into an “applied 
social science” and the scientific basis sought was being attacked by the 
anti-professionalism and anti-expertise of the time.30  
The second impulse was from the streets. Many American cities 
reached their peak population in 1950 and, by the early 1970s, were 
tumbling in downward spirals of inner-city decline, white flight, racism, 
urban poverty, inequality, deindustrialization, declining schools and 
public services, and urban violence.31 Those who came of age only in the 
twenty-first century—when cities were celebrated as the lively centers 
of the high-tech information age (with its creative class and urban 
triumphalism), and the dominant worries were gentrification and 
congestion—may struggle to fully appreciate the sense of despair, 
bewilderment, and desperation in many American cities during the 
1960s and 1970s.32 And here was this relatively new field of urban 
planning that could not “solve” wicked problems in the conventional 
deterministic sense. Technocratic optimism, scientific modeling, and 
modernist urban renewal agendas seemed ineffective in the efforts to 
reverse this urban decline.33  
Rittel and Webber articulated the concept of “wicked problems” 
during this tumultuous period of social and scientific upheaval. In doing 
so, they provided an alternative explanation of planning’s apparent 
inability to “solve” the urban crisis.34 The deficiency was not that 
planners lacked the intelligence, methodological skills, or scientific 
rigor to solve urban problems. Instead, the difficulty lay in the nature 
of planning problems themselves. As the pair explained, “We shall want 
to suggest that the social professions were misled somewhere along the 
line into assuming they could be applied scientists—that they could 
solve problems in the ways scientists can solve their sorts of problems. 
The error has been a serious one.”35 Planners’ reinterpretation of the 
field’s crisis was a somber recognition that urban planning faced an 
unruly collection of intractable challenges. But it was also a reassuring 
 
 30. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 156–57 (discussing the anti-professionalism 
movement’s opposition to the field of planning). 
 31. BRENT D. RYAN, DESIGN AFTER DECLINE: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS SHRINKING CITIES 37–
38 (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2012) (discussing the catastrophic changes in and 
declining population of major U.S. cities in the second half of the twentieth century). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259 (discussing 
the frustrations of early planners in applying rational quantitative modeling to  
planning problems). 
 34. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1.  
 35. Id. at 160. 
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argument: the criticisms of the planning profession as underdeveloped 
and ineffective were misplaced. One should not mechanistically and 
inappropriately apply the scientific standards from the natural sciences 
and engineering to social policy. The article suggested an alternative 
tactic: recognizing wicked problems would lead planners to strategically 
reorient their problem-solving methods.36 
In the nearly fifty years since Rittel and Webber’s work, both 
planning’s theoretical culture and the nature of urban problems have 
profoundly changed.37 But wicked problems are as relevant now as 
then. The field now uses the “wicked problem” moniker in response to 
an era of megacities, globalization, climate change, terrorism, 
sustainability, and Habermasian communicative action.38 The 
relationship between science and planning has also changed. In the 
1970s, planners experienced the frustration of translating technological 
and scientific progress into social planning and policy.39 Today, 
expectations about science and urban planning are more nuanced if not 
contradictory. Some planners have embraced a qualitative, narrative 
approach to planning as discursive collaboration among a pluralistic 
public in pursuit of democracy and social justice.40 Others have 
embraced urban informatics, geographic information systems (“GIS”), 
spatial analysis, “big data,” and quantitative evaluation.41 Planners 
therefore acknowledge the persistent role of wicked problems in their 
work yet seek divergent strategies—both discursive and technical—to 
alternatively accommodate, tame, or overcome these wicked problems. 
There is a risk of overusing the term “wicked problem,” and one 
should be wary of the casual, imprecise use of the term in the literature. 
Authors frequently use the term when they really just want to describe 
a hard, difficult problem that has led to a lot of controversy and 
conflict.42 One is well advised to return to the source and review Rittel 
and Webber’s original list of ten characteristics of wicked problems.43 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 262–63. 
 38. See, e.g., FRANK P. INCROPERA, CLIMATE CHANGE: A WICKED PROBLEM (2015); C. Jotin 
Khisty & Steen Leleur, Citizen Participation Through Communicative Action Towards a New 
Framework and Synthesis, 31 J. ADVANCED TRANSP. 119, 129–30 (1997) (analyzing a case study 
for applying the Habermas communicative theory to a “wicked problem”). 
 39. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 262.  
 40. See Ralf Brand & Frank Gaffikinn, Collaborative Planning in an Uncollaborative World, 
6 PLAN. THEORY 282, 291–92 (2007) (examining how collaborative planning can take place in a 
pluralist society to promote democracy and social justice).  
 41. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 267. 
 42. See id. at 262; John C. Camillus, Strategy as a Wicked Problem, HARV. BUS. REV., May 
2008, at 98, 100 (explaining what makes a wicked problem different from ordinary problems). 
 43. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 161–67. 
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This misuse is similar to the misplaced use of the term “complex” when 
a situation or system is merely complicated. 
Our own research explores the confluence of wicked problems 
and complex systems.44 Both approaches view the urban world as 
diverse, pluralistic, and dynamic—a world ill-suited to traditional 
optimization and equilibrium modeling.45 We observe that the complex 
systems underlying human settlements (encompassing their social, 
biological, and built infrastructure) generate wicked problems through 
interactions, heterogeneity, feedback, neighborhood effects, and 
tensions between individual and collective interests.46 Conversely, 
planning can use the tools of complex systems to mitigate and adapt to 
these wicked problems in ways that traditional, mechanistic planning 
tools cannot.47 As such, wicked problems come full circle: complexity is 
both the source of intractable wicked problems and a way to trace the 
pathway out. 
We view complex systems as not simply a contemporary 
synonym of wicked problems, but also a needed adaptation and 
evolution of the 1970s wicked problem framework. This updating 
reflects a generational shift in planning thought: today’s planners 
approach complex problems with tools and cultural politics that would 
often be unknown to planners in the 1970s. Indeed, the shift in planning 
language from Rittel and Webber’s “wicked problems” to today’s 
“complex systems” is a proxy of the larger changes in planning theory 
over these fifty years.48 Planners define problems differently, temper 
their belief in technical progress, and approach social justice, race, 
gender, and environmentalism with more integrated strategies.49 We 
have explained elsewhere: 
Rittel and Webber were responding to a Cold-War overconfidence in the universal 
applicability of scientific problem solving (and perhaps to the waning overconfidence in 
American political-technical dominance). Today’s planning scholarship works in a more 
 
 44. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 45. See sources cited supra note 3.  
 46. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259, 261. 
 47. See id. at 262, 270 (discussing how tools like big data alone or “rational, quantitative, 
comprehensive modeling” are ineffective for complex systems). 
 48. Compare Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 160 (framing planning issues as “wicked 
problems”), with Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 262–63 
(placing the discussion of planning and “wicked problems” within a “complex systems” framework). 
 49. See, e.g., Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 267 
(“Technical fixes are not the way out of wicked problems without coordination and 
collaboration . . . .”); id. at 262–63 (recharacterizing “wicked problems” as complex systems); Scott 
D. Campbell, Sustainable Development and Social Justice: Conflicting Urgencies and the Search 
for Common Ground in Urban and Regional Planning, 1 MICH. J. SUSTAINABILITY 75 (2013) 
(examining urban planning’s simultaneous pursuit of both sustainability and social justice, 
including racial and gender justice). 
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bifurcated era . . . of healthy scientific skepticism (arising both from environmental and 
community activism), troubling anti-science (e.g., right-wing attacks on climate change 
modeling), and a new era of (over)confidence in information-age problem-solving (Big 
Data, networking, personal device connectivity, GIS, the “Internet of Things,” and so-
called “Smart Cities”).50  
Complex systems cannot “solve” wicked problems in the 
conventional, deterministic sense. But complex systems can help 
redefine and unravel wicked problems while retaining their diversity, 
interdependence, and “messiness.” Complex systems tools—such as 
agent-based modeling, cellular automata, networks, and system 
dynamics—cannot predict the future or determine a single, optimal 
solution. They instead encourage both planners and citizens to explore 
various future scenarios, while considering interactions, feedback loops, 
social learning, and the emergence of innovative, new urban patterns 
and behaviors.51 The very characteristics of wicked problems that trip 
up traditional statistical and mathematical analysis become prolific 
ingredients for complex systems analysis. 
That said, the implementation of complex systems-based 
planning strategies still lags far behind its potential. Planners are quick 
to acknowledge complexity as a characteristic of cities but so far have 
been slow to convert complex systems thinking into concrete planning 
solutions.52 We observe three stages: (1) a general acknowledgment of 
complexity as a characteristic; (2) analytically understanding the 
complex workings of a system; and (3) engaging complexity as a 
planning strategy.53  
The first step is simply recognizing that urban systems are 
complex. This is a vital but often vapid statement, since frequently  
it is merely the observation that urban problems are  
difficult, messy, and intractable. And imprecise observers too  
casually conflate complicatedness (many variables, large scale,  
long-term) with complexity (interaction, feedback, uncertainty,  
adaptation, emergence).54  
The second step is using complex systems reasoning and 
analysis to get inside the system and understand its internal workings, 
logic, and dynamics. This requires “thinking like an agent”: How do 
 
 50. Zellner & Campbell, Planning for Deep-Rooted Problems, supra note 3, at 459. 
 51. Id. at 461 (“Complex systems analysis cannot resolve these challenges of uneven political 
power and resources. But complex systems tools can assist planners with other barriers to 
implementing communicative action: scalability, multiple forms of knowledge, highly technical 
information, long-term and cumulative impacts, and unintended consequences.”). 
 52. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 258–59 (“There 
is an enduring gap between acknowledgement of complexity and harnessing complexity . . . .”). 
 53. See infra Table 2. 
 54. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259. 
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agents (such as homeowners, employers, residents, commuters) 
interact, learn, cooperate, compete, and adapt with other agents in the 
system? What are the system-wide effects of the aggregation of 
individual decisions?55 
The third step is the hardest: moving from analysis to planning 
practice. How does one incorporate complex systems thinking into the 
open political world of public planning and urban development? 
Strategies for this third step may be as varied as planning itself, such 
as exploring and evaluating a set of alternative future scenarios, 
visualizing the system-wide effects of a change in single or multiple 
policies, and engaging diverse stakeholders at a public meeting in 
complex systems thinking.56 
We use this three-stage framework not only to suggest a 
pathway for planners to sequentially engage complexity, but also to 
explain why complexity has not been widely adopted in the profession. 
Planners often get stuck in the first or second step. This disconnect 
between description, explanation, and practical action is pervasive 
throughout planning and other public policy professions, though the 
complexity of urban systems makes this disjunction particularly acute. 
II. HOW DO PLANNERS THINK ABOUT SUSTAINABILITY? 
Planning has explicitly engaged sustainability since the 1980s, 
with a growing emphasis since the 1990s.57 Frequently idealized, and 
often contested, sustainability remains for urban planning a leitmotif, 
core value, and go-to keyword. Alternately thoughtful and picayune 
voices have bemoaned sustainability’s shortcomings: its vague vision of 
the future, its dilution through overuse, and its deference to the status 
quo and system maintenance. Critics have argued for the concept’s 
dethroning, either by resilience, regenerative cultures, or 
environmental justice. Yet sustainability retains its hold at the center 
of the field.58  
This recent focus on sustainability builds on a much longer 
planning tradition of debating the broader tensions between 
urbanization and environmentalism. Urban planning, as a modern 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., TIMOTHY BEATLEY & KRISTY MANNING, THE ECOLOGY OF PLACE: PLANNING FOR 
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY, AND COMMUNITY (1997); William E. Rees, Defining “Sustainable 
Development,” CHS RSCH. BULL., May 1989, at 1; SIM VAN DER RYN & PETER CALTHORPE, 
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES: A NEW DESIGN SYNTHESIS FOR CITIES, SUBURBS AND TOWNS (1991). 
 58. See, e.g., Edward J. Jepson Jr., Planning and Sustainability, in URBAN PLANNING IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 104–05 (2009) (discussing the centrality of sustainability to systems planning). 
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profession, arose as a child of the Progressive Era at the end of the 
nineteenth century, influenced by good government movements, 
housing reform, the conservation movement, city beautification efforts, 
and sanitary reform (especially efforts to provide clean water to cities).59 
At its core, planning was a collective, reformist response to the rapid 
urbanization of the industrial revolution and the massive conversion of 
rural and small-town landscapes into dense urban centers.60 Managing 
the relationship between town and countryside, and thus between 
human economic activity and the natural environment, has long been a 
central task of planning—a task recently practiced under the banner of 
“sustainable development,” but one with a much longer history. 
Sustainable planning is thus a hybrid: a composite of old and 
new; of science and politics, technics and ideology; of homegrown, 
planning-specific ideas and many borrowed concepts from other fields; 
of analytical social critique, pre-industrial nostalgia, and lofty futuristic 
aspirations. It builds on Progressive Era garden cities and conservation, 
New Deal resource management, 1970s environmentalism and 
bioregionalism, and twenty-first century environmental justice and 
climate science.61 It draws heavily on broader sustainability 
influences—from the Brundtland Report62 to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change63—while emphasizing the local governance 
and spatial development dimensions. Sustainability’s emphasis on 
intergenerational and intergroup equity and focus on the long-range 
future in current decisionmaking resonate with urban planning’s core 
values.64 This inclusive, composite nature of sustainability sometimes 
leads to semantic frustration, but it has also created a dynamic, 
evolving, and broadly supported agenda for planning.  
Contemporary urban planning is the governance practice of 
reconciling tensions between divergent stakeholders over the use of 
space, whether zoning regulations, property rights, public space and 
access, spillover effects, transportation mobility, infrastructure, and so 
 
 59. Susan S. Fainstein, Urban Planning, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (July 20, 1998), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/urban-planning/The-era-of-industrialization [https://perma.cc/ 
G5EB-Z2FF]. 
 60. See id. (“Giant sprawling cities developed during this era . . . .”). 
 61. Campbell, supra note 49, at 77; see also Fainstein, supra note 59 (discussing how 
Ebenezer Howard’s utopian concept of a garden city influenced the appearance of residential areas 
in the United States). 
 62. See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter 
Brundtland Report].  
 63. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR URBAN 
POLICYMAKERS: WHAT THE IPCC REPORT ON GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5C MEANS FOR CITIES (2018). 
 64. Campbell, supra note 49, at 88 (“Sustainability also endures because it taps  
into planning’s core ideas and values, and links well to other dominant themes in  
contemporary planning . . . .”). 
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on.65 In broad terms, planning manages tension between three core 
impulses: economic development, environmental protection, and social 
equity. We can call this triad the “planner’s triangle,”66 with 
sustainability at its heart.67 
Promoting the green, productive, and fair city is not a simple 
task, yet it can be achieved through the engaged and persistent 
negotiation for balance in three tensions: the resource conflict (between 
environmental protection and economic development), the property 
conflict (between economic development and social justice), and the 
development conflict (between environmental protection and social 
justice). These conflicts reflect the tensions intrinsic to urban societies. 
FIGURE 1: THE PLANNER’S TRIANGLE68 
 
The resolution of each of these three conflicts requires 
institutional frameworks (legal, regulatory, market-based, political). 
 
 65. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259 (positing 
that employing complexity as a planning strategy requires engaging diverse stakeholders in 
complex systems thinking that involves trade-offs). 
 66. See infra Figure 1 (The Planner’s Triangle). 
 67. Scott Campbell, Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities? Urban Planning and the 
Contradictions of Sustainable Development, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N, 29, 298, 301–05 (1996) 
[hereinafter Campbell, Green Cities]; Scott D. Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited: 
Sustainability and the Evolution of a Planning Ideal That Can’t Stand Still, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 
388, 389 (2016) [hereinafter Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited]. 
 68. This version of the Planner’s Triangle has been revised and updated. Compare Campbell, 
The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 389, with Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 
67, at 298.  
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This leads to a distinctive history of governance for each conflict. The 
first conflict to be formally engaged was the property conflict, through 
the incremental construction of the modern social welfare state (e.g., 
the 1880s in Germany, the beginning of the twentieth century in the 
United Kingdom, the 1930s in the United States).69 The state stepped 
in to address tensions between the interests of economic development 
(e.g., industrial capital) and social justice (e.g., labor unions, housing 
advocates) in an era of rapid urban industrialization. The broader 
institutions to engage these property conflicts are thus well established, 
both at the national and local levels, notwithstanding recent neoliberal 
austerity pushbacks. The resource conflict led to more recent elaborate 
institutions of environmental regulation and resource management.70 
Like the social welfare state, these arrangements vary widely by state 
and nation, are often woefully insufficient, and are challenged by 
political opposition, yet nevertheless remain “richly embedded in the 
institutions of the modern state and in the practices of planning.”71 The 
development conflict, unlike the prior two conflicts, lacks a stable and 
consensus governance framework: 
By contrast, there is arguably no corresponding set of established, robust institutions to 
manage the development conflict, either internationally or domestically. Environmental 
justice (EJ) may be a rich area of scholarship and community organizing (such as 
community benefits agreements), but it remains otherwise underdeveloped and not 
adequately embedded in institutional practices and regulation (despite the existence, for 
example, of a modest-sized EPA program on EJ).72  
The Planner’s Triangle has been appealing for both its simplicity 
and its depth: a simplicity that is stable and a depth that allows for a 
dynamic interplay between persistence and fragility, the kind of 
creative destruction that C.S. Holling, Lance Gunderson, Gary 
Peterson, and other scholars draw from to describe resilient systems.73 
Although many have envisioned sustainable development as a win-win 
outcome to enable continued growth without environmental costs, the 
model’s focus on reconciling three conflicts suggested a more realistic 
view of the inevitability of trade-offs in a finite world.74 Sustainability 
at the center of this triangle meant, perhaps, the realization of it as an 
 
 69. See Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 389. 
 70. Id. at 392; see also Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67, at 299 (highlighting the 
resource management aspect through the example of timber yields). 
 71. Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 392. 
 72. Id.; see also Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67, at 309 (arguing for an expansion in 
joint tasks like public-private partnerships).  
 73. C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Garry D. Peterson, Sustainability and Panarchies, 
in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 63, 72–74 
(C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson eds., 2002). 
 74. Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67, at 396. 
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elusive, moving target. While impossible to reach, it is the process of 
attempting sustainability through a purposeful planning practice that 
can allow us to, at the very least, bring these tensions to the forefront, 
make them visible, and negotiate them, which is better than the 
alternative of assuming these conflicts away.75  
Urban planners have thus embraced the vision and ideology of 
sustainability as a central organizing principle for their discipline. But 
how well have planners integrated sustainability into planning practice 
and translated these ideals into outcomes measured by environmental 
quality and improved public health? Twenty years ago, Phil Berke and 
Maria Conroy evaluated thirty comprehensive plans to assess how well 
cities were planning for sustainable development.76 They found no 
major differences between plans that explicitly and intentionally 
incorporated sustainability principles and those that did not.77 The 
former tended to emphasize only some principles, particularly the 
livable built environment, but did not offer a balanced approach among 
all the others identified.78 Very little attention was given to the polluter 
pay principle and the responsible regionalism principle, since these 
would require major institutional and political changes that in the 
United States, at least, are not widely supported by powerful sectors of 
society.79 A survey of medium and large cities found that cities were not 
systematic in their adoption of sustainability initiatives, and there was 
little evidence of a broader commitment in terms of specific 
sustainability plans and sustainability positions.80 More recently, Liao 
et al. built on a longitudinal national data set of local plans for 
sustainability between 2010 and 2015 to study the relationship between 
planning and implementation of sustainability strategies, looking at 
both places where sustainability was explicitly a goal of local plans and 
places where it was not.81 While having plans in place was found to be 
correlated with higher levels of action, that effect tended to be short-
lived.82 Both resource availability and commitment and citizen 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Philip R. Berke & Maria Manta Conroy, Are We Planning for Sustainable Development? 
An Evaluation of 30 Comprehensive Plans, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 21 (2000). 
 77. Id. at 26.  
 78. Id. at 27. 
 79. Id. at 29–30.  
 80. Devashree Saha & Robert G. Paterson, Local Government Efforts to Promote the “Three 
Es” of Sustainable Development: Survey in Medium to Large Cities in the United States, 28 J. PLAN. 
EDUC. & RSCH. 21, 28 (2008).  
 81. Lu Liao, Mildred E. Warner & George C. Homsy, When Do Plans Matter? Tracking 
Changes in Local Government Sustainability Actions from 2010 to 2015, 86 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N  
60 (2020). 
 82. Id. at 68. 
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participation also increased action.83 This trend is confirmed by a 
survey administered in 2015 in which many respondents considered 
environmental protection a priority, though only a third reported 
adoption in planning documents.84 Moreover, economic factors and 
priorities compete with sustainability goals and present an obstacle  
to sustainability planning in the form of financial constraints  
for implementation.85  
The above assessment underlines the highly varied levels of 
engagement with sustainability. We identify three levels, which 
parallel the three stages we identified in working with complexity 
(acknowledgement, analysis, implementation).86 That is, planners face 
three questions in confronting sustainability: (1) What is wrong with 
the current situation? (2) How did our history of urbanization (and our 
approach to using environmental resources to build and run cities) lead 
to this crisis? (3) What is to be done?   
The first stage is the acknowledgment of the current 
environmental crisis: to use the concept of unsustainability to 
reinterpret environmental impacts with an emphasis on rates of 
resource depletion and regeneration, and thus the threat to the long-
term viability of natural systems.87 The Brundtland Report codified and 
elevated this framework of recognizing the tensions among economic 
development, environment protection, and addressing the needs of the 
poor in undeveloped communities.88 Sustainability becomes both a 
metric to identify the environmental costs of current practices and an 
aspirational goal for the future. 
The second stage is to decipher the underlying causes of this 
crisis: to advance beyond seeing unsustainability as a general symptom 
and develop a systemic diagnosis of our unsustainable cities and their 
structural dynamics.89 This incorporates in-depth analysis by building 
on a scientific understanding of socio-ecological systems and their 
feedback mechanisms. This is a challenging task since it involves not 
just the detailed understanding of multiple systems (nature, the 
economy, cities, politics), each with their own methods and logic, but 
 
 83. Id. at 69. 
 84. ICMA, SUSTAINABLE CMTYS. DIV. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N., SMALL TOWN & RURAL PLAN. 
DIVS. OF THE AM. PLAN. ASS’N, BINGHAMTON UNIV., CORNELL UNIV. & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUSTAINABILITY PRACTICES, 2015 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2016), 
https://icma.org/sites/default/files/308135_2015%20Sustainability%20Survey%20Report%20Final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR7T-4T7F].  
 85. Id.  
 86. See infra Table 2. 
 87. See infra Table 2 (Stage 1: Acknowledgement).  
 88. Brundtland Report, supra note 62, at 5–6. 
 89. See infra Table 2 (Stage 2: Analysis).  
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also understanding how these various systems interact and collide.90 
This is where we observe planning lagging, as the field is not 
particularly strong in providing the training required to build on this 
understanding to then propose appropriate planning strategies (the 
next phase, below).  
The third stage is to develop planning strategies to steer these 
systems into more sustainable outcomes.91 Beyond knowledge of 
technology, design, and future scenarios modeling, this involves the 
ability to translate plans into effective policy and find ways to leverage 
resources and political alliances to overcome opposition and get these 
plans implemented. This also necessitates the participation of diverse 
stakeholders, as trade-offs are inevitable and must be negotiated. Given 
the lack of training required to better understand socio-ecological 
systems and, with that understanding, support the design of effective 
planning strategies, sustainability is incorporated as a concept in 
planning documents, but it does not always lead to progress in the 
fundamental approach to planning.92 Planning as a field is not 
sufficiently contributing to generating alternative solutions. Table 2 
below summarizes the three stages (acknowledgement, analysis, and 
implementation) as they relate to both complexity and sustainability. 
 
 
 90. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259–60. 
 91. See infra Table 2 (Stage 3: Implementation (Governance)). 
 92. See, e.g., Liao et al., supra note 81, at 71 (“A more comprehensive and integrative set of 
considerations may be required to encourage continued increase in local government sustainability 
efforts in the long run . . . .”).  
3–Campbell & Zellner_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/22/2020  8:52 PM 
2020] URBAN GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY  1661 
TABLE 2: THREE STAGES OF ENGAGING COMPLEXITY AND 










Sustainability Recognition of the 
costs of 
environmental 
damage and the long-
term unviability of 
the status-quo 
 
Unsustainability as a 
symptom   
Understanding of 
unsustainability as 






diagnosis of the 
underlying causes 




Sustainability as an 
analytical method 
Converting this 
analytical knowledge into 
policy & practice to 
manage conflicting trade-
offs and transform the 
functioning of the urban 
environmental system 




Sustainability as a 
planning strategy 
Complexity A view from outside 
looking in 
 
Treats complexity as 
a black box 
 
Statements such as 
“cities are complex!” 
(without advancing 
beyond that general 
observation) 
 
Complexity as a 
symptom 
Understanding 








“thinking like an 
agent”—
understanding the 
logic of agent based 
modeling (“ABM”) 
 
Complexity as a 
dynamic 
Moving from analytical 
observation to practice 
 
Using participatory 




Complexity as a strategy 
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III. THE CONUNDRUM OF RECONCILING GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Urban planning’s engagement with sustainability would 
arguably be far easier—and more straightforward—if the field’s sole 
responsibility was to design and manage cities to protect the natural 
environment. The profession would single-mindedly promote the strict 
regulation of new construction, discourage private auto and air travel, 
tightly regulate polluting industries and infrastructures, and mandate 
smaller housing units to be clustered near urban centers with strict 
open space preservation beyond city limits. But urban planning has a 
much broader professional portfolio: promoting vibrant local economies 
and strong fiscal revenues with expanding job markets, advocating for 
the needs of the poor and marginalized, as well as fostering healthy 
living conditions and good urban design.93 These divergent priorities 
pull planners in competing directions.94 The result is an ambivalent 
relationship towards growth of cities, land consumption, housing, 
employment, natural resource consumption, and GDP. 
There is a long tradition in planning of resisting excessive 
growth and mitigating the negative impacts of such growth.95 And yet 
urban planning is an arm of local government, which has many strong 
motives to promote growth—increase tax revenues, improve public 
services, promote real estate and construction sectors, and strengthen 
political power—and many dire examples of the social and political 
costs of urban decline.96 The critical social geographer David Harvey 
astutely observed this seemingly unavoidable professional mandate:  
[T]he planner’s task is to contribute to the processes of social reproduction and that in so 
doing the planner is equipped with powers vis-à-vis the production, maintenance, and 
management of the built environment which permit him or her to intervene in order to 
stabilize, to create the conditions for “balanced growth” . . . .97 
Planning’s conflicted stance toward growth in turn leads to a 
complex and often convoluted approach to sustainability: the profession 
overtly professes a loyal commitment to environmental stewardship but 
has a tacit growth imperative. And this intrinsic contradiction creates 
 
 93. See Nikil Saval, The Plight of the Urban Planner, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/the-plight-of-the-urban-planner 
[https://perma.cc/4R5E-MMVL]. 
 94. See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Planner’s Triangle). 
 95. See, e.g., George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to Growth Management: Vermont, Oregon, and 
a Synthesis, 10 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 13 (1996) (detailing the history of incentives and problems with 
rapid urban growth and attempted state regulatory solutions).  
 96. See Brent T. White, Simone M. Sepe & Saura Masconale, Urban Decay, Austerity, and the 
Rule of Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2014) (highlighting issues facing cities like Detroit and Baltimore).  
 97. DAVID HARVEY, THE URBANIZATION OF CAPITAL: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
CAPITALIST URBANIZATION 175 (1985). 
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a stubborn impediment to progressing beyond the first stage of 
sustainability (acknowledgement) through the second (analysis) and to 
the third (implementation).98 For some planners, this barrier takes the 
form of a general lack of understanding—or outright denial—of the 
existence of biophysical limits to unlimited growth that is embedded in 
most planning efforts.99 For expanding cities, this growth is often a 
given. For struggling cities, it is an unquestioned (though often elusive) 
aspiration. Not growing is often interpreted not just as decline, but as 
failure, something to avoid at all costs. In recent years the degrowth 
movement has emerged, but has nevertheless been met with significant 
skepticism and remains more central to activism—and stronger in 
Europe than in the United States—than to planning scholarship or 
practice.100 Before the degrowth movement, “shrinking cities” was a 
relatively marginal interest in planning, but whose focus remained the 
management of decline, a resignation after population is already lost, 
most certainly not an aspiration or a planned strategy ahead of 
depopulation.101 We still use “housing starts,” new building permits, 
construction employment, traffic volume, retail expansion, and GDP 
growth as markers of a healthy economy.  
The landmark Brundtland Report revealed this conflicting role 
of growth as both exacerbating environmental degradation and 
bringing millions out of poverty: 
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable—to ensure that it meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. The concept of sustainable development does imply limits—not absolute limits 
but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on 
environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human 
activities. But technology and social organization can be both managed and improved to 
make way for a new era of economic growth.102  
 
 98. Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 259–60 (identifying 
and explaining “three stages: (1) external acknowledgement of complexity; (2) understanding 
complexity from the inside; and (3) engaging complexity as a planning strategy”).  
 99. William E. Rees, Cities as Dissipative Structures: Global Change and the Vulnerability of 
Urban Civilization, in SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE: THE EMERGING PARADIGM AND THE URBAN 
ENVIRONMENT 247, 249 (M.P. Weinstein & R.E. Turner eds., 2012) (“The growth-oriented beliefs, 
values, and assumptions underpinning contemporary economic models and consequential 
‘environmental’ behavior are fundamentally at odds with the biophysical laws and dynamics 
governing vital ecosystems and geophysical systems.”).  
 100. Ari Aukusti Lehtinen, Degrowth in City Planning, 196 FENNIA 43, 44 (2018); François 
Schneider, Housing for Degrowth Narratives, in HOUSING FOR DEGROWTH: PRINCIPLES, MODELS, 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 14, 14 (Anitra Nelson & François Schneider eds., 2019).  
 101. Justin B. Hollander, Karina M. Pallagst, Terry Schwarz & Frank J. Popper, Planning 
Shrinking Cities, 72 PROGRESS PLAN. 223, 223–24 (2009); RYAN, supra note 31, at 20–22; Brent D. 
Ryan & Shuqi Gao, Plan Implementation Challenges in a Shrinking City: A Conformance 
Evaluation of Youngstown’s (OH) Comprehensive Plan with a Subsequent Zoning Code, 85 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 424 (2019).   
 102. Brundtland Report, supra note 62, at 8.  
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The Commission dances a contradictory pas de deux around the issue 
of growth—both acknowledging the present-day need for limits but also 
diplomatically presuming that future generations will behave better 
and manage growth and technology in more responsible ways than past 
generations have.  
The urgent challenge, then, is to find an alternative to the 
strategy of growing our way out of social inequality. We will have to 
come to terms with what all systems scientists know full well: unlimited 
growth is not possible in a finite world.103 There is no such thing as 
sustainable growth.104 Growth, paradoxically, leads to collapse. Our 
regional and global resource systems are already following that 
trajectory.105 An alluring solution would be to promote sustainability by 
curbing growth, and indeed some economists106 and systems thinkers107 
have long argued for steady state economics. It is an appealing vision of 
sustainability: a future where human development is driven not by the 
expansion of material consumption of goods and natural resources, but 
rather by the intensification and refinement of non-material 
development (in the arts, education, culture, social capital). Why, then, 
are these no-growth arguments (of decoupling social progress from 
resource exploitation) commonly dismissed or ignored? Society has 
developed a long-running habit of relying on the paradigm of growth as 
an expedient solution to social problems.108 If social strife chronically 
arises from conflicts over limited and unequal access to property (land, 
housing, food, resources, capital), then society has habitually sought to 
 
 103. DONELLA H. MEADOWS, DENNIS L. MEADOWS, JØRGEN RANDERS & WILLIAM W. BEHRENS 
III, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF ROME’S PROJECT ON THE PREDICAMENT 
OF MANKIND 178–79 (1972). 
 104. Moira Zellner, It Is Easier to Be Smart Than to Be Green, in REMAKING THE URBAN SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: HEALTH, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 87, 89 (Michael A. Pagano ed., 2016). 
 105. Graham M. Turner, A Comparison of The Limits of Growth with 30 Years of Reality, 18 
GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 397, 400; Graham M. Turner, On the Cusp of Global Collapse? Updated 
Comparison of The Limits of Growth with Historical Data, 21 GAIA: ECOLOGICAL PERSPS. FOR SCI. 
& SOC’Y 116, 120–21 (2012).  
 106. HERMAN E. DALY, STEADY STATE ECONOMICS (2d. ed. 1991); HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. 
COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE 
ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1989).  
 107. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 103, at 156–61.  
 108. William E. Rees, Globalization and Sustainability: Conflict or Convergence?, 22 BULL. 
SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 249, 251 (2002):  
All major national governments and mainstream international agencies are united in 
a vision of global development and poverty alleviation centered on unlimited economic 
expansion fueled by open markets and more liberalized trade. At the heart of this 
expansionist vision (the “dominant economic paradigm”) is the belief that human 
welfare can all but be equated with ever-increasing material well-being  
(income growth). 
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dampen these structural tensions (i.e., “property conflicts”109) by 
expanding the aggregate supply of property.110 Promoting more 
equitable resource distribution has long been seen as more politically 
acceptable (and less threatening) to elites in times of expanding GDP 
rather than in times of stagnation.111 Crises of capital accumulation can 
be “fixed”—at least temporarily—through spatial expansion of local and 
regional economies.112 Although systems thinking and natural sciences 
understand the inherent limits of a world with finite resources, 
business sectors continue arguing for never-ending economic expansion 
and supply oriented solutions.  This perspective is reinforced by intense 
lobbying of political leaders and reliance on flawed and misleading 
theories (e.g., growth as a recipe to address all social ills, technological 
innovation as a way out of all the problems caused by growth) and 
metrics of success (e.g., GDP).113 Growth does not solve these crises, but 
merely postpones them—yet promoting growth has been an appealing 
strategy of “kicking the can down the road.” Growth has become a 
politically expedient addiction that is stubbornly hard to kick. 
The governance path to urban sustainability is thus not through 
the avoidance of but rather through the direct engagement with core 
tensions in society. These tensions are also intrinsically embedded 
within the disciplinary tradition of urban planning. The field has two 
seemingly contradictory impulses. Often in the name of sustainability, 
planners emphasize “urban growth boundaries, sustainable 
development, ‘small is beautiful,’ and reducing our ecological footprint 
to mitigate the downsides of excessive materialism.”114 Yet the 
profession also promotes expansion through “urban growth coalitions, 
the expansion of jobs and tax revenues, the construction of 
infrastructure, and the push for more intensive land uses.”115 Although 
this tension is not a new development in planning, it has renewed 
exigency in an era of climate change and massive global urbanization. 
As a result, the marriage of sustainability and urban planning is not 
without internal strife.  
 
 109. See supra Figure 1 (placing “property conflict” between the planner’s goals of “economic 
development” and “equity [and] social justice”).  
 110. Rees, supra note 108, at 251.  
 111. See id. at 255–56 (detailing the inverse of this theory where under-developed and low 
GDP countries are least likely to see equitable wealth distribution).  
 112. DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY 246 (2001) 
(“Geographical expansion and geographical concentration are both to be regarded as the product 
of the same striving to create new opportunities for capital accumulation.”).  
 113. Rees, supra note 108, at 251.  
 114. Campbell, supra note 12, at 131. 
 115. Id.  
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This paradox between growth and conservation manifests itself 
in multiple contemporary planning situations. We will illustrate this 
paradox in this Article’s two case studies: ecogentrification and 
megaregional sustainability. For ecogentrification, it is the collision 
between sustainability’s call for urban living with a more modest 
ecological footprint and the persistent push (by urban residents, real 
estate developers, etc.) to improve urban living conditions and extract 
more value from property through more intensive use of land, more 
intensive up-zoning, and more intensive consumer activity.116 
Ecogentrification then becomes a form of green conspicuous 
consumption—a commodification of sustainability that belies a growth-
oriented urbanization impulse and undermines efforts to live more 
modestly on the land. For megaregional sustainability, this new 
supersized territorial system offers the promise of coordinated, 
ecoregional management of water, land, food, and energy systems along 
principles of integrated sustainability.117 But too often, these 
megaregions and their emergent governance coalitions promote 
regional economic growth over conservation, as these large urban 
settlements aggressively sprawl out and convert farmland and 
wilderness into exurbia, edge city office parks and “rural industrial” 
landscapes.118 Complex systems thinking may suggest ways out of  
this paradox.  
A. Case 1: Ecogentrification 
We selected “ecogentrification,” or “environmental 
gentrification,” as a timely case study of complex, wicked problems 
because it conjoins several present-day urban disputes: 
unsustainability, housing unaffordability and displacement, and 
growing inequality and segregation.119 Ecogentrification is therefore a 
portmanteau of two ongoing planning challenges: the unsustainability 
of human settlements and the growing inequality that expresses itself 
spatially in housing markets. Both issues individually have long 
histories. The Berlin-born, U.K.-based sociologist Ruth Glass first spoke 
of “gentrification” in 1964 to describe the movement of affluent new 
classes into formerly working-class neighborhoods of an increasingly 
 
 116. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 147. 
 117. Campbell, supra note 12, at 128.  
 118. See id. at 132–33. 
 119. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 146–47 (“The term has since been more widely deployed to 
describe the vicious cycle of economic disinvestment and environmental degradation that devalues 
urban space, followed by subsequent reinvestment and environmental remediation that increases 
property values and displaces exiting residents.”).  
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affluent postwar London.120 The term eventually spread to the United 
States and elsewhere to describe the process of urban revitalization 
(often accompanied by displacement) in post-industrial cities.121 The 
idea of the ecological city has an even longer and more varied history 
(and many names), from early Progressive Era conservationist and 
preservationist movements, through the environmentalism of the 
1970s, sustainability of the 1980s (and beyond), and now climate 
adaptation and mitigation.122 But we are only recently witnessing the 
interaction of these two ideologies and strategies. 
What motivated the creation of this new, hybrid term? For 
skeptics, the rise of ecogentrification represents a hijacked and 
corrupted version of sustainable development in an increasingly 
privatized, polarized, and post-Keynesian society.123 It portends the 
shift away from an egalitarian, public vision of sustainable cities with 
universal public infrastructure and public goods, including 
environmental quality.124 Rather than a society-wide strategy towards 
sustainability for all, we will instead see increased efforts among those 
with resources and power to promote and occupy green islands of high 
environmental quality (masquerading as sustainable communities).125 
For lower-income communities fighting for less pollution, it often means 
being displaced by higher rents and property taxes after the 
environmental improvements are made.126 Ecogentrification  
may represent a new variant of environmental injustice or 
environmental racism.127 
 
 120. RUTH GLASS, LONDON: ASPECTS OF CHANGE, at xviii–xix (1964). 
 121. See, e.g., Melissa Checker, Wiped Out by the “Greenwave”: Environmental Gentrification 
and the Paradoxical Politics of Urban Sustainability, 23 CITY & SOC’Y 210, 212 (“On one hand, I 
argue that [environmental gentrification] marks a recent iteration of old discourses about urban 
reform, renewal and revitalization, which similarly masked inequitable urban development.”).  
 122. See id. at 215–16 (“The linking of ecological benefits to social uplift goes back to the turn 
of the 20th century.”); Rice et al., supra note 7, at 150–51 (describing “the rise of environmentally 
minded professional[s]” who “exhibit a strong desire to live an eco-friendly urban lifestyle”).  
 123. See Rice et al., supra note 7, at 146–47 (detailing the “failure” of New York City’s High 
Line Park, which quickly became a tourist destination and source of increased property values). 
 124. Id. at 159–60.  
 125. Isabelle Anguelovski, James J.T. Connolly, Hamil Pearsall, Galia Shokry, Melissa 
Checker, Juliana Maantay, Kenneth Gould, Tammy Lewis, Andrew Maroko & J. Timmons 
Roberts, Why Green “Climate Gentrification” Threatens Poor and Vulnerable Populations, 116 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 26139, 26139 (2019).  
 126. Juliana A. Maantay & Andrew R. Maroko, Brownfields to Greenfields: Environmental 
Justice Versus Environmental Gentrification, 15 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 2233, 2244 
(2018) (“Green gentrification has implications for environmental justice because existing lower-
income residents are likely to be displaced after their community is improved environmentally.”). 
 127. Jennifer R. Wolch, Jason Byrne & Joshua P. Newell, Urban Green Space, Public Health, 
and Environmental Justice: The Challenge of Making Cities ‘Just Green Enough,’ 125 LANDSCAPE 
& URB. PLAN. 234, 236–37 (2014).  
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Yet, there is no consensus that “ecogentrification” is necessarily 
a negative process or that the term itself is even an accurate diagnosis. 
More upbeat urban observers see it as a generally positive merging of 
urban revitalization and sustainability strategies, including urban 
greening, transit-oriented development, and an emphasis on walkable 
and bikeable communities.128 This compound neologism has tricky 
normative reverberations: the prefix “eco” generally suggests warm, 
positive, and publicly minded connotations, while “gentrification” 
typically—perhaps unfairly—has negative connotations as a proxy and 
scapegoat for inequality and displacement. Combining the two terms 
does not necessarily create an oxymoron, though it may lend a 
nefarious, deceptive, or camouflage quality to “eco,” similar to the 
criticism of corporate sustainability efforts as merely 
“greenwashing.”129 The resulting tension should not come as a surprise:  
if gentrification is a contradictory process, then ecogentrification is too. 
And so local governments may find themselves on both sides of 
the divide: both promoting (through subsidies, regulations, etc.) 
environmental improvements in their neighborhoods and, at the same 
time, feeling the pressure to address the inequalities and displacement 
that may arise from these strategies.130 Communities may thus feel in 
a bind: How do we deal with the trade-offs between the benefits of 
environmental improvement that also make places more attractive to 
residents and businesses (and raise their market value), and the 
ensuing displacement of those who can no longer afford to live there by 
a new culture of middle class ecoconscious, green living? Or in the words 
of a recent article, “Can we green the hood without gentrifying it?”131 
What makes ecogentrification a wicked problem? We see 
multiple characteristics present with ecogentrification: no singular 
definition or explanation of the phenomenon (overregulation of housing 
and land markets? income inequality? shifting consumer tastes? 
unwillingness for current tenants to relocate?); no obvious solution to 
the problem; solving this problem may lead to other problems; no 
 
 128. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 149.  
 129. See Bruce Watson, The Troubling Evolution of Corporate Greenwashing,  
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/ 
2016/aug/20/greenwashingenvironmentalism-lies-companies [https://perma.cc/8RMY-XCK6] 
(“Many companies are now working to engage customers in their sustainability efforts, even as 
their core business model remains environmentally unsustainable.”).  
 130. Jeanne Haffner, The Dangers of Eco-Gentrification: What’s the Best Way to Make a City 
Greener?, GUARDIAN (May 6, 2015, 2:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/06/ 
dangers-ecogentrification-best-way-make-city-greener [https://perma.cc/3K4E-LRST]; Rice et al., 
supra note 7, at 146–47. 
 131. Brentin Mock, Can We Green the Hood Without Gentrifying It?, GRIST (Feb. 9, 2015), 
https://grist.org/cities/can-we-green-the-hood-without-gentrifying-it/ [https://perma.cc/N5NY-
4DPZ]. 
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stopping rule for policy interventions, since housing markets are fluid 
and dynamic; gentrification is as much a normative as a descriptive 
analytical category; and gentrification is a symptom of another problem 
with dynamics such as income inequality and social-spatial mobility.132 
And one might conclude that if gentrification and sustainability are 
each individually complex, wicked problems, then their alliance (as 
ecogentrification) leads to an even more complex, wicked problem.  
From a sustainability perspective, ecogentrification arises from 
the tensions across the 3Es (environment, economy, equity) of the 
Planner’s Triangle,133 but the environmental improvement that gives 
rise to ecogentrification does not resolve these tensions. If anything, it 
worsens them. Even the ecosystem functions may be rather weak 
beyond the aesthetic appeal or beautification goals of the 
improvements. That is, many of these projects are not only displacing 
lower-income populations, but may also amount to little more than 
greenwashing as higher-income and higher-consuming populations 
move in.134 Trade-offs and compensation across sectors of the population 
affected are not consciously and openly deliberated and addressed.135 
For this, it would be necessary to conduct fuller ecological and social 
studies—in addition to the more commonly thorough economic 
analyses—and to include stakeholder participatation in these analyses 
and the debates they should support. These participatory studies must 
be conducted within a systems framework to fully grasp how economic 
preferences and cultural aspirations generate unintended 
consequences. Wolch et al. suggest the “just green enough” approach to 
environmental improvement, advocating for participatory, bottom-up 
planning processes that support small-scale improvements—as opposed 
to grand projects of green development—to ensure that all sectors, 
particularly current residents and businesses, are heard and contribute 
to the transformation and benefit from it.136 Yet, the kinds of small-
scale interventions Wolch et al. propose do not guarantee that 
gentrification will not occur if those interventions still create an overall 
attractive neighborhood for new residents and businesses, unless 
financial barriers are established in the form of rent controls or 
 
 132. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 165.  
 133. See Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67, at 301–05 (“Slowing worldwide industrial 
expansion may preserve more of the world’s resources for the future . . . but it may also undermine 
the efforts of the underdeveloped world to approach the living standards of the west.”).   
 134. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 146. 
 135. See id. at 160 (discussing the “failure of many academics and practitioners to see climate 
and housing justice as directly related”). 
 136. Wolch et al., supra note 127, at 241. 
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property tax restructuring.137 The elephant in the room is the insistence 
on growth as a pathway towards development and the land speculation 
process that growth generates.138 Some limits must be set. Yet this 
unquestioned growth is what is pushing our urban systems—and the 
remote systems they depend on—to socioeconomic and environmental 
collapse.139 In the meantime, the environmental needs of minorities and 
low-income communities continue to be ignored, and the needs and 
wants of those with higher purchasing power are prioritized. 
What kind of governance problem is ecogentrification? 
Governance can mean many things, but an effective public policy 
response to a social problem has several prerequisites: a consensus 
definition of the problem and acknowledgement that it is indeed a 
“problem” requiring intervention, knowledge of cause-effect and 
consequences, identification of key parties and interests, the ability to 
imagine multiple interventions and evaluate and compare each, and 
strategic knowledge of the scope and limits of public power  
and authority.140 
Here we see how ecogentrification’s nature as a wicked problem 
in turn creates governance challenges. There is no consensus about the 
nature of the problem, and thus the governance pathway to solutions. 
At its core, is it an environmental regulation problem? Or a housing and 
land use problem that might involve zoning changes or rent control? Or 
a problem of income and racial inequality, including segregation? Or 
instead a question of the uneven allocation of public services like parks 
and other infrastructure? This multi-faceted framework of 
ecogentrification raises tricky issues of whose jurisdiction the task falls 
into and whether the state even has the authority to intervene. In 
addition, who is the affected interest group or constituency? That is, 
who wants the “problem” to be solved? This is particularly a challenge 
when some groups in the region may not see “ecogentrification” as a 
problem at all, but rather a misnomer for a lifestyle and residential 
choice.141 The mixed blessings of ecogentrification—its contradictory 
blend of positive and problematic consequences—further muddle the 
search for a clear governance strategy.  
 
 137. See id. at 235 (advocating for the “just green enough” approach, which requires “planners 
and local stakeholders to design green space projects that are explicitly shaped by community 
concerns, needs, and desires rather than either conventional urban design formulae or  
ecological restoration”). 
 138. William E. Rees, Economic Development and Environmental Protection, 86 ENV’T 
MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 29, 32 (2003).  
 139. See id. at 41 (“[T]he prevailing growth-based economic ‘development’ paradigm is 
fundamentally incompatible with ecological and social sustainability.”). 
 140. See Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3, at 276. 
 141. See Mock, supra note 131. 
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B. Case 2: Megaregional Sustainability:  
A New Geography in Search of Governance 
We next turn to the emergence of the megaregion as a new 
urbanization form and as a sustainability governance challenge. The 
megaregion leads to complex, new intergovernmental coordination 
challenges (both horizontal and vertical); boundary issues; new forms 
of land use; and the related political cultures of new types of settlements 
beyond the old school typology of the traditional monocentric region 
(cities, suburbs, rural).142 
What distinguishes the megaregion from the traditional notion 
of the region? The classical definition of a region is a central city and its 
surrounding hinterland: inner- and outer-ring suburbs and farmland 
beyond.143 One region is distinct from the next, separated by rural land 
uses and wilderness; the U.S. Census codifies this notion in its 
definition of the Metropolitan Statistical Area.144 We use the modifier 
“metropolitan” to recognize the presence of a central city at the core of 
the region—as distinct from rural regions that lack an urban core.  
The megaregion is understandably larger than a conventional 
region. But more importantly, it represents the complex evolution and 
expansion of traditional metropolitan regions through the overlapping 
and blurring of several metropolitan regions into a larger network.145 
Governance in traditional metropolitan areas is problematic enough 
given the lack of regional planning traditions and authorities in the 
United States.146 Metropolitan planning organizations are chronically 
marginalized and underfunded in the United States, and they need to 
compete for resources and attention in an already crowded 
interjurisdictional field at the city, county, state, and federal level (and 
also townships in some states).147 Megaregions also introduce possible 
 
 142. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 130. 
 143. Cheryl K. Contant & Karen Leone de Nie, Scale Matters: Rethinking Planning 
Approaches Across Jurisdictional and Sectoral Boundaries, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR 
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 12, at 11, 15. 
 144. 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 37246, 37246, 37248–50 (June 28, 2010) (notice announcing the “adoption of 2010 Standards 
for Delineating Metropolitan . . . Statistical Areas,” which were influenced by Census  
Bureau research). 
 145. Contant & Leone de Nie, supra note 143, at 15. 
 146. Myron Orfield & Thomas F. Luce Jr., Governing American Metropolitan Areas: Spatial 
Policy and Regional Governance, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, 
supra note 12, at 250 (discussing the American “tradition of local [government] control” despite 
the fact that the Constitution makes no mention of local governments). 
 147. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-868, METROPOLITAN PLANNING 
ORGANIZATIONS: OPTIONS EXIST TO ENHANCE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING CAPACITY AND FEDERAL 
OVERSIGHT 16–17 (2009) (“About 85 percent of all MPOs responding to our survey cited the lack of 
transportation planning funding as a challenge to transportation planning. . . . Additionally, 71 
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competition and tension between multiple central cities within  
the megaregion.148 
For its supporters, the megaregion represents a new, dynamic, 
and competitive geographic actor in the global economy—a large 
multicentric conglomeration that has the scale, shared infrastructure 
(airports, highways, housing, office, and labor markets), and diverse 
array of amenities to compete in the big leagues.149 For its detractors, 
the megaregion is a sprawling mess—the latest mutation in the 
distinctively American proclivity to commute long distances, convert 
farmland into suburbia, overconsume land and open space, and 
obliterate the needed greenbelt boundaries between one region and the 
next.150 As such, it represents for some the failure of American political 
culture to plan adequately, act as wise stewards of the land, and reign 
in reckless real estate markets. The rise of megaregional development 
has far outpaced our ability to keep up with the capacity to govern. The 
megaregion is an appealing spatial phenomenon, an emerging 
analytical category, and a set of normative aspirations that has not yet 
become a functioning administrative unit.  
The United States currently has eleven commonly recognized 
megaregions, as promoted by the Regional Plan Association’s work on 
America 2050.151 The largest is the Northeast megaregion, stretching 
along Interstate 95 and Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor from Boston and 
coastal New England, through New York City, to Philadelphia and 
Baltimore, down through Washington, D.C., and into Virginia.152 Sixty 
years ago, before the popular rise of the term “megaregion,” the 
geographer Jean Gottmann named this agglomeration “Megalopolis.”153 
Some of these megaregions have a relatively coherent 
geographic structure—with their polycentric structure (and multiple 
central cities) nevertheless dominated by a large central city: the 
Piedmont Atlantic (with Atlanta at its core), the Front Range (Denver), 
Arizona Sun Corridor (Phoenix), and Southern California (Los 
Angeles).154 Other megaregions have multiple urban cores where no one 
 
percent of small MPO survey respondents cited competing priorities between transportation 
planning and other tasks related to the council of governments as a challenge.”). 
 148. Orfield & Luce, supra note 146, at 251. 
 149. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 128. 
 150. See id. at 132–33. 
 151. See Hagler, supra note 11, at 1. 
 152. REG’L PLAN ASS’N, NORTHEAST MEGAREGION 2050: A COMMON FUTURE 9 (2007), 
https://rpa.org/uploads/pdfs/2050-Northeast-Megaregion-A-Common-Future.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
KMY7-MF6W]. 
 153. JEAN GOTTMAN, MEGALOPOLIS: THE URBANIZED NORTHEASTERN SEABOARD OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (1961). 
 154. See Hagler, supra note 11, at 6, 7. 
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city overwhelmingly dominates: Cascadia (Vancouver, Seattle, 
Portland, the Willamette Valley), Northern California (San Francisco, 
Oakland, San Jose/Silicon Valley, Sacramento), the Texas Triangle 
(Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, San Antonio, Austin), the Gulf Coast 
(stretching from Alabama to the Texas-Mexico border), the sprawling 
urban conglomerations of Florida, and the physically decentralized 
megaregion of the Great Lakes.155 
This set of megaregions is notably a diverse group, with wide 
variation in history, size, internal structure, economic strength, 
ecology, and cultural identity.156 Some assert their megaregional 
identity through shared ecological features (such as Cascadia),157 while 
others assert their dynamic, business-friendly, and economically 
competitive cultures (such as the Piedmont Atlantic or the  
Texas Triangle).158  
The megaregion raises complex new challenges for 
sustainability governance. Geographers and systems planners 
understandably are attracted by the promise of the megaregion: the 
comprehensive scale is large enough to encompass the holistic scale of 
large spatial systems, be it environmental (watersheds, air basins, 
habitats),159 socioeconomic (labor and housing markets),160 or logistical 
(transportation and other infrastructure, supply chains within 
industrial clusters).161 Yet this large scale invariably means that 
planning and regulation require coordination across many jurisdictions, 
both horizontally (city to city, county to county, sometimes state to 
state) and vertically (between city, county, state, and even federal 
governments).162 The result is a multidimensional complexity of 
interjurisdictional cooperation, where mutual mistrust and a lack of a 
strong regional administrative tradition (or jurisprudence) in the 
United States often lead localities to balk at region-wide efforts—even 
when the resulting benefits are all too apparent, at least to planners.163  
 
 155. See id.  
 156. See id. at 6. 
 157. AM. 2050, REG’L PLAN ASS’N, CONNECTING CASCADIA: A HIGH-SPEED RAIL VISION FOR  
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 3–4 (2010), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/2050-
Connecting-Cascadia-Briefing-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QKF-6XPA].  
 158. Ming Zhang, Frederick Steiner & Kent Butler, Connecting the Texas Triangle: Economic 
Integration and Transportation Coordination, REG’L PLAN ASS’N & LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y 21, 
26–27 (2007), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/2050-The-Healdsburg-Research-
Seminar-on-Megaregions-2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMK2-Q8Z7]. 
 159. Campbell, supra note 12, at 128. 
 160. Orfield & Luce, supra note 146, at 252. 
 161. Catherine L. Ross & Jessica L.H. Doyle, The Megaregion and the Future of American 
Planning, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 12, at 280, 285. 
 162. See Orfield & Luce, supra note 146, at 250. 
 163. Contant & Leone de Nie, supra note 143, at 14. 
3–Campbell & Zellner_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/22/2020  8:52 PM 
1674 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:6:1643 
Adding to this interjurisdictional complexity is the inherent 
complexity and uncertainty of spatial planning. Urban planning is an 
inherently interdisciplinary activity that has long since broken with its 
early twentieth-century legacy as simply architecture (focusing on the 
building and site) enlarged to the city scale (i.e., urban design).164 Over 
the decades, through eras of crisis and transformation—from the Great 
Depression and New Deal through postwar suburbanization, 1970s 
deindustrialization and urban crisis, Reagan-era neoliberalism and 
today’s multicultural globalization and climate crisis—planning has 
repeatedly reinvented itself as it grew into new areas.165 On the 
traditional foundations of physical planning (land use, zoning, and 
urban design), urban planning has expanded into housing, community 
advocacy, economic development, transportation, environmentalism, 
social justice, international development, and climate adaptation.166 
Today’s planning school graduates enter a planning workforce that 
extends far beyond the zoning desk and architecture firms.  
This broad set of priorities and methodologies makes for an 
excitingly diverse professional discipline. But it also means that 
planning—working in an open field of problems with permeable 
boundaries—has an uncertain mandate and authority in its work. 
Rittel and Webber traced wicked problems to the dynamics of the “open 
societal systems” of cities, where it is difficult to definitively formulate 
problems, clearly articulate a set of potential solutions, test solutions, 
or conclusively “solve” a problem without realizing that the initial 
problem is merely a symptom of another problem.167  
So, the planner, in confronting the challenges of these emergent 
megaregions, faces two complexities: the spatial complexity of a large, 
internally diverse and unruly area sprawling over thousands of square 
miles and the disciplinary complexity of multiple tasks and urban 
systems often in the absence of clear administrative authority or 
adequate resources. Governance becomes less a task of the direct 
implementation of plans and enforcement of regulations and more the 
 
 164. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 156. 
 165. See Fainstein, supra note 59 (tracing urban planning’s development and growth as a 
discipline); PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF URBAN PLANNING 
AND DESIGN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (4th ed. 2014) (surveying modern planning literature 
and providing a comprehensive overview of the discipline’s progression). 
 166. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 131–32; Bishwapriya Sanyal, Lawrence J. Vale & 
Christina D. Rosan, Four Planning Conversations, in PLANNING IDEAS THAT MATTER: LIVABILITY, 
TERRITORIALITY, GOVERNANCE, AND REFLECTIVE PRACTICE 1, 4–5 (Bishwapriya Sanyal, Michael 
Teitz & Christina D. Rosan eds., 2012). 
 167. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 160 (noting that “the classical paradigm of science 
and engineering—the paradigm that has underlain modern professionalism—is not applicable to 
the problems of open societal systems” presented by urban planning issues). 
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task of building alliances, mediating conflicts between the many 
stakeholders, and leveraging the limited power and resources of 
planning agencies. Governance also involves promoting a shared vision 
of regional development and identity, facilitating community 
participation in regional planning efforts, and helping the community 
translate ideas into the maps, plans, and agendas of regional 
development. And since building regional communities and identity is 
a slow-moving, never-ending process over many years, planners need to 
play the long game, combining patience and persistence and marking 
intermediate successes to boost morale. 
In the end, the megaregion evokes a new, greatly enlarged 
spatial scale without a coherent and articulated set of institutions to 
manage and guide its development. The social and environmental 
opportunities and challenges are numerous, from massive 
infrastructural projects to the loss of farmland and wilderness, social 
inequality in access to work, public services, and amenities, and the 
challenges of long commutes and unaffordable housing.168 The shifting 
emphasis on megaregions has no intrinsic stance towards 
sustainability. The megaregion opens up possibilities for new kinds of 
integrated ecological planning and land management and coordination 
across multiple jurisdictions.169 And yet the megaregion has no intrinsic 
stance towards sustainability, and such large-scale development opens 
up new pathways to greater resource extraction, more expansive urban 
land uses, and exploitation.170 And unless one is an ardent true believer 
in the ability of private markets to resolve environmental, social, and 
land use conflicts, the megaregion presents novel planning challenges 
and dynamic, complex, and unpredictable consequences that existing 
local and county institutions are ill-equipped to handle. Megaregions 
are an emerging urbanization phenomenon in search of new  
governance models. 
IV. UNPACKING COMPLEXITY TO UNDERSTAND ECOGENTRIFICATION 
AND THE CHALLENGES OF MEGAREGIONAL SUSTAINABILITY 
The analytical power of complex systems thinking is not simply 
to describe and diagnose wicked problems such as environmental 
 
 168. See Tridib Banerjee, Megaregions or Megasprawls? Issues of Density, Urban Design, and 
Quality Growth, in MEGAREGIONS: PLANNING FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 12, at 83, 
91–92 (“[Q]uestions of future density, affordable housing, environmental justice, equality in 
educational opportunity, equity in access to open space and amenities for public life, improved 
mobility, equal promises and possibilities for healthy living, and the like are all inextricably linked 
to the structure and institutions of local governance in America.”). 
 169. Campbell, supra note 12, at 128. 
 170. Id. at 131–33. 
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degradation and the climate crisis, but also to lead to the next step of 
engaging these problems and developing strategic planning 
responses.171 How might a complexity perspective and its tools help 
understand the unresolved tensions of sustainability and point towards 
paths forward to address these conflicts? In this Part we examine the 
potential of systems thinking, which provides tools to model the 
interaction of factors that perpetuate pollution and gentrification 
problems. In particular, we discuss the use of causal loop diagrams 
(several examples included below), a method to articulate how the 
causal interconnection of variables influences the behavior of parts of a 
system and how the connection across these parts into the larger system 
may lead to unintended consequences.172 This discussion might seem a 
detour into a rather detailed method, but it graphically illustrates how 
we can use complex systems thinking in the engagement and 
governance of wicked problems. 
Causal loop diagrams employ several conventions. The 
components or variables must clearly increase or decrease.173 The name 
of the variable should also always be positive or neutral in value so it is 
clear whether it is increasing or decreasing (e.g., “tax base” over 
“decreasing tax base”).174 The other part of a causal loop diagram is the 
relationship among variables. The direction of this relationship may be 
direct or inverse.175 In the first case, when the causal component 
increases, the effect it is linked to will also increase. Otherwise, when 
the cause increases, the effect decreases. As an illustration, as 
environmental quality in a lake increases, the fish population will also 
increase, which will in turn drive up the number of fishermen. These 
three factors (environmental quality, fish population, and number of 
fishermen) would be linked with two arrows (one originating in 
environmental quality towards fish population, and one from fish 
population to number of fishermen), showing a direct relationship (they 
all increase or decrease together). The increase in fishermen, however, 
would also decrease the fish population, so an arrow would originate 
from the number of fishermen to fish population, in this case an inverse 
relationship because as the former increases, the latter decreases, or 
vice versa.  
 
 171. See supra Table 2; Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3,  
at 260–61. 
 172. Daniel H. Kim, Guidelines for Drawing Causal Loop Diagrams, 3 SYS. THINKER 1,  
1–3 (1992). 
 173. Id. at 2. 
 174. See id. (explaining best practices for choosing variable names). 
 175. Id. at 1. 
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Using the above guidelines and way of thinking, we can propose 
a diagram that may explain how ecogentrification arises. Figure 2a 
shows one proposal for how it might work in a mostly industrial 
community surrounded by low-income neighborhoods, as may be the 
case for Pilsen, a neighborhood in the Lower West Side of Chicago. The 
purple variables generally refer to economic factors, the green to 
environmental, and the yellow to social. The blue and red arrows 
correspond to direct and indirect relationships, respectively, while the 
dashed arrows indicate relationships that can be either direct or 
inverse. The processes leading to ecogentrification can be understood by 
parsing out the system in smaller stories and identifying the self-
reinforcing loops (virtuous or vicious cycles) and the balancing loops. 
 




In this first part of the story, encapsulated in Figure 2b, we 
highlight the economic development process of having factories and 
businesses that supply jobs. The operation of factories and businesses 
will generate more traffic, as will the number of jobs, assuming 
employees will also contribute to traffic as they get to and from work. 
All this economic activity generates tax revenue. It is uncertain 
whether factories contribute to tax revenues, as it is not uncommon for 
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them to make deals with local government to have their taxes waived 
in exchange for jobs (hence the dashed line).  
 
FIGURE 2B: CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF ECOGENTRIFICATION (SUBSET) 
 
 
Tax revenue can also provide the resources needed to green a 
neighborhood by financing the development of green space. The 
problem is that such improvements also increase land value, like 
infrastructure does.176 Air quality may improve with such green space, 
but it will have to make up for whatever pollution is still being emitted 
by factories, rising traffic, and the general greater consumption of an 
increasing population. Environmental justice groups have led many 
efforts towards improvements in air quality and public health, 
particularly in low-income neighborhoods where polluting activities 
tend to be located.177 In some cases, they may even be successful in 
 
 176. Wolch et al., supra note 127, at 238 (“In addition, new studies suggest that urban greening 
efforts may also be inflating property values . . . potentially leading to gentrification and thus 
displacing lower-income earners.”). 
 177. ANA ISABEL BAPTISTA, TISHMAN ENV’T & DESIGN CTR., THE NEW SCH., LOCAL POLICIES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NATIONAL SCAN 13, 19–22 (2019), https://www.nrdc.org/ 
sites/default/files/local-policies-environmental-justice-national-scan-tishman-201902.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/JPC2-42AN]. 
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removing the polluting sources from their communities.178 
Paradoxically, however, by triggering environmental improvements, 
which consequently improve public health and reduce the burden on 
public services, the system is set to increase land values and displace 
the very population that initiated the improvement. The Bloomingdale 
Trail in Chicago (a former elevated railway converted into a greenway) 
is a prime example of such transformations.179 Figure 2c illustrates the 
mechanisms by which this displacement occurs. 
FIGURE 2C: CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF ECOGENTRIFICATION (SUBSET) 
 
As land values increase, so do taxes and the tax revenue that a 
local government can collect. Jobs also contribute to land value as they 
attract residents to the area. As land values (and taxes and rent) 
increase, neighborhood income levels increase, reinforcing the rise of 
land value as the general demand for land by higher-income 
 
 178. Id. at 27–28. 
 179. Ryan Ori, Affordable Housing Is Vanishing as Gentrification Casts a Shadow over the 
606, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 15, 2020, 2:57 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/ryan-ori/ct-biz-
606-trail-housing-prices-ryan-ori-20200115-wvjgab2h2zd63ko33t2xqerkiy-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/T547-CMBJ]. 
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populations increases. Rising land values may increase the 
attractiveness of the neighborhood for higher-income residents but 
deter the lower-income residents (hence the dashed line). A higher tax 
revenue, supported by residents, increases land values, attracts 
businesses, and further solidifies this self-reinforcing trend, as now 
there are more resources to invest in infrastructure and public services, 
which further increases land value and attracts residents and 
businesses. The greater number of residents and businesses, however, 
will generate more consumption and pollution, in terms of traffic, 
energy use, and waste generation (not shown in the diagram, for 
simplicity). Factories in this case may have a detrimental effect and 
eventually be pushed out of these now more expensive neighborhoods. 
While this could be mostly an economic process, it can also become a 
political one, as observed above. With a higher-income population, there 
may be greater chances of success to remove the polluting sources. What 
this does, however, is simply move the problem elsewhere, typically to 
another low-income community. The move of General Iron Industrial 
Inc. (a scrap metal processor) from Lincoln Park to the Southeast Side 
in Chicago is an example of such a process, which now becomes a 
regional problem.180 Figure 2d illustrates these intricate relationships.  
 
 180. David Roeder, Scrap Metal Recycler General Iron Reaches Deal to Vacate North Side  
Site, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019, 6:59 PM CDT), https://chicago.suntimes.com/ 
news/2019/9/11/20861601/general-iron-scrap-metal-labkon [https://perma.cc/KV44-YLF4]. 
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FIGURE 2D: CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM OF ECOGENTRIFICATION (SUBSET) 
 
These four diagrams illustrate the complex linkage of the first of 
our two case studies: ecogentrification. Although not provided here, one 
could draw an analogous set of diagrams to examine our second case: 
megaregional sustainability challenges. As an illustration, we focus on 
regional pollution, where the factories that are displaced from an area 
thanks to environmental activism and economic pressures are now 
moved to an area that may have a similar internal systemic structure, 
but the new area has a very diminished tax base. That further 
reinforces the process of lowering land value in that area, which further 
diminishes any chance of investments leading to a stronger tax base. 
With a diminishing tax base, divestment in public services and 
infrastructure ensues, leading to further business and population loss. 
In the originating neighborhood, the added consumption that goes hand 
in hand with increased income levels imposes other regional burdens. 
For example, pollution and resource depletion increase locally, such as 
through traffic, depending on the way in which energy, food, and other 
goods are produced to support that community’s consumption. As 
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already high-resourced areas flourish economically and win their local 
environmental battles (although perhaps only aesthetically), lower-
income communities are further depleted in what becomes a classic case 
of environmental injustice.  
How does applying a complex system view to this problem help 
inform governance questions? We can use causal loop diagrams like the 
ones above to identify which are the mechanisms that backfire, either 
by reinforcing an exclusionary mechanism, or by cancelling out any 
environmental or social benefits. Once identified, they can be the focus 
of targeted interventions to ensure environmental improvements 
without the social drawbacks. For example, one aspect to consider here 
is the role of a community’s tax base in ensuring the economic 
sustainability of different efforts. On one hand, polluting sources, if 
maintained, must heavily contribute to this tax base, something that is 
rarely done. Providing jobs is not enough. The other is that, as land 
value increases, economic controls and property tax restructuring can 
be set in place to ensure that low-income residents can benefit from a 
higher quality of life and not be displaced. This, however, will only work 
as long as we limit the influx of new residents (growth), given that, at 
some level, more residents and businesses start burdening the system 
with increased consumption and pollution produced by higher economic 
activity. Without such controls in place, a neighborhood could ostensibly 
oscillate between cycles of economic booms and busts. The same self-
reinforcing mechanisms that support a transition towards 
gentrification can also lead to a vicious downward cycle of 
disinvestment, worsening environmental quality, and outmigration (a 
“death spiral”), seen in too many communities where pollution is 
exported. Checks and balances, however, can help stabilize a system 
over extended periods of time. 
In brief, causal loop diagrams make visible the interconnected 
forces of an urban system, illustrating how dynamic feedback loops can 
trigger vicious and virtuous cycles and exacerbate the unequal 
development of thriving and struggling neighborhoods. These diagrams 
also reveal points of potential intervention, where strategic policies and 
investments can leverage positive change that reverberates throughout 
the system. Yes, these diagrams are highly conceptual representations 
with unavoidable simplifications, but this simplicity also makes them 
more transparent and accessible. Planners can develop these diagrams 
collaboratively with community stakeholders and thereby support 
efforts to address the wickedness of urban problems. These causal loop 
diagrams are one of many complex systems tools, including  
system dynamics modeling, fuzzy cognitive mapping, and  
agent-based modeling.  
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CONCLUSION: ADAPTATION, COMPLEXITY, GOVERNANCE 
This Article has explored the links between wicked problems, 
complex systems, sustainability, and governance from the perspective 
of urban planning and development, using as illustrations the  
two emergent spatial phenomena of ecogentrification and  
megaregional sustainability.  
Governance of urban systems is not a straightforward, neutral 
task. As a result, we employ an expansive definition of governance, 
including both formal government institutions and a rich array of 
private and nonprofit organizations. The result is a pluralistic, 
dynamic, and complex system of urbanization and change, in which 
formal municipal regulatory agencies have only limited authority and 
resources. One therefore cannot approach cities with the same single-
minded focus on efficiency, optimization, or Tayloristic management as 
found in operations research, civil engineering, or accounting. Cities are 
inherently diverse, political, resource constrained, and lacking complete 
information.181 Because cities are complex, open social systems that 
lead to wicked problems, urban governance is invariably the 
management of wicked problems. Planning engages “tame,” tractable 
problems as well, though these understandably generate less 
controversy and attention. And because cities are internally 
heterogeneous, with uneven development, inequality, segregation, and 
zones of inclusion and exclusion, addressing social justice has a long 
(but often uneven) tradition in urban planning. 
This “open system” extends beyond the city limits into nature as 
well. Planners must therefore govern the interaction between the city 
and the countryside and between humans and the rest of the planet. 
This has led to the profession’s recent commitment to promoting 
sustainable urbanism, a broadly defined concept. Urban governance 
then becomes the mediation of conflicts between environmental 
protection, local economic development, and social equity, and 
ultimately a challenge to growth as a solution for socioeconomic 
problems.182 As a wicked complex problem, the governance of 
sustainable cities will not lead to a tidy, stable solution with the end 
result of an optimal, balanced, and sustainable city, but instead will 
 
 181. See supra Table 1.   
 182. See generally Campbell, Green Cities, supra note 67 (noting that traditional aims of urban 
planning are inherently in tension with sustainability goals and presenting “the Planner’s 
Triangle”); Campbell, supra note 49 (noting that urban planners seek to balance sustainability 
and social justice); Campbell, The Planner’s Triangle Revisited, supra note 67 (reexamining the 
Planner’s Triangle twenty years after its inception). 
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likely be an ongoing effort, full of trial and error, support,  
and opposition.  
We conclude this Article with a more ambitious and speculative 
conception of a sustainable social order. The transition to support the 
governance of sustainability—moving from Stage 2 to Stage 3 in Table 
2—involves reimagining the Planner’s Triangle as a more complex and 
multidimensional representation, as illustrated in Figure 3. While its 
simplicity is compelling, its two-dimensional representation limits us to 
binary tensions, without being able to understand the fuller depth of 
the system. We advocate for a stronger inclusion of complex systems 
thinking and analysis: from 3Es to 3D.183  
 




The triangle of social priorities, bounded by the circle of the four 
classical elements, represents the acknowledgment that human activity 
must operate within a finite biophysical world. Though a bounded 
world, this is not a static world, but one of creative destruction that is 
 
 183. Source cited supra note 3. 
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in constant flux—hence the fading circle of basic life elements. As long 
as we remain within those bounds, then we can be sustainable in the 
provision of goods and services, though the achievement of 
sustainability does not guarantee fairness or stability. Sustainable 
human settlements, therefore, are a necessary prerequisite but not a 
sufficient or complete condition for a better society. 
If we therefore place well-being, rather than sustainability, at 
the pinnacle of our future goals, then we must collectively build the 
institutional, socioeconomic, and physical capital to support resilient 
systems to provide services equitably across the various sectors of the 
global population. This ambitious goal requires several crucial 
accomplishments: an understanding of the interconnectedness of social, 
economic, and environmental variables; the identification and 
restructuring of intervention/leverage points that trigger pernicious 
self-reinforcing processes; and the promotion of appropriate balancing 
mechanisms that can stabilize a socioecological system. We illustrated 
how to unpack this complexity with causal loop diagramming for our 
two cases (ecogentrification and megaregional sustainability). While 
conceptual, these are powerful tools to support dialogue, 
understanding, policy innovation, and resolution of trade-offs. Causal 
loop diagrams can also serve as a foundation for other quantitative 
techniques like system dynamics and agent-based modeling, to more 
precisely inform policy and governance. The way to operationalize this 
activity within planning and governance is to rely on approaches such 
as participatory modeling, which can represent the biophysical limits 
while keeping track of the evolving complexity that society must always 
work with, in addition to acknowledging and building on the also 
evolving diversity of values and needs of different communities.184 
Thus, urban governance is not the process of planning a sustainable end 
state and permanently achieving it, but rather a never-ending process 




 184. See generally Charles Hoch, Moira Zellner, Dan Milz, Josh Radinsky & Leilah Lyons, 
Seeing Is Not Believing: Cognitive Bias and Modelling in Collaborative Planning, 16 PLAN. THEORY 
& PRAC. 319 (2015); Zellner & Campbell, Planning With(In) Complexity, supra note 3. 
